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This paper develops a framework to analyze how choices are made when R&D competition occurs between two 
firms, and the aggressiveness-time tradeoffs have to be resolved in multiple stages. At issue is the way in which 
resources are used at each stage, i.e. are aggressiveness problems undertaken and solved (slowly) or are quick 
solutions adopted in an effort to get the product to market faster? We first analyze why differently positioned 
firms choose different targets. We focus on this translation between ex ante asymmetries between firms and ex 
post asymmetries in the equilibrium outcomes. Our second focus is on  understanding the implications of the 
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Most of the existing work on sequential R&D is of decision theoretic nature. The idea is 
usually to study different aspects of the resource allocation process as the stages of R&D 
unfold. Grossman and Shapiro (1986) analyse the optimal profile of R&D effort over multiple 
stages and distinguish between situations where there is a stochastic relationship. Payoffs are 
received only upon completion of all stages. In both cases, they show that optimal resource 
allocation increases as more stages elapse. In contrast, Dutta (1997) shows that, in the case 
where the total available budget is given exogenously and flow payoffs result from 
completion of the stages, the optimal allocation involves greater expenditures in the early 
stages. However, if the payoffs are only received upon completion of all stages, then the 
optimal allocation is to spread the budget evenly across all stages. Gallini and Kotowitz 
(1985) model R& D as drawing experiments, without replacement, from a series of known 
potential experiments. The characteristics, including the length, of each experiment are fixed, 
but the length of the entire program is determined endogenously. They derive time profiles of 
R&D, involving both parallel consideration of multiple experiments, and sequential 
consideration of separate experiments. Granot  and Zuckerman (1991) are also concerned with 
the sequencing of known activities. In earlier work, Roberts and Weitzman (1981) have 
derived operational rules for investing criteria in sequential R&D projects. They distinguish 
between processes for which all stages must be completed before payoffs result, and those 
where the stages are optional and the project may be terminated at any stage and also offer a 
taxonomy of sequential processes along other dimensions. 
Analyses of sequential R&D that take into account the strategic interaction between firms 
are fewer and far between. Grossman & Shapiro (1987) analyse a two firm, two stage game, 
with benefits accruing to the first firm to finish both stages, with the intention of studying how 
the investment level of a firm depends on its relative position in an R&D race. They show that 
typically the firm that gets in the lead steps up its effort level, while the firm that falls behind 
lowers its effort level. Park (1987) carries out a similar analysis. As we shall see below, our 
analysis of the aggressiveness-speed tradeoff results in quite different resource utilization 
patterns in similar two stage games. In their study of multi-stage races, Harris and Vickers 
(1987) reach the principal conclusion that the-race leader invests more than the follower. This 
conclusion too is modified in our analysis of multi-stage games. Two stage strategic 
interactions have been used in other situations as well. eg. Fershtman and Kamien (1990) 
study the strategic interaction between two firms when the product requires development of 
two complementary technologies. Their focus is on investigating the circumstances under 
which cross licensing results at the intermediate stage where each firm has developed only 
one technology. In a different vein, Vickers (1986) analyses the response of a duopoly to a 
sequence of process innovations and contrasts situations of “increasing dominance” where the 
incumbent firm remains dominant with those of “action-reaction” where the firm with the 
current best technology alternates. Beath et al. (1987) extend this analysis to consider a 
sequence of product innovations. 
In this paper, we model the R&D process as one that is composed of a series of stages, at 
each of which some set of product characteristics are determined . At each stage, the firm 
exercises discretion as to the extent to which the particular stage characteristics will be 
developed. Further, when the firm's R&D resource endowment is fixed and stage specific, the 
firm faces a tradeoff between the extent to which it will develop the stage characteristics and  8 
the time that it will spend in doing so.We will refer to the degree to which the stage 
characteristic is developed as the characteristic's (targeted) level of aggressiveness. In this 
sense, the more aggressive are the product characteristics, the greater the profits the firm can 
expect to get from the product but the longer is the expected time to completion of R&D. We 
will speak of this as the aggressiveness-time tradeoff in each stage. When the completion of 
R&D requires many such tradeoffs to be resolved sequentially, firms will, at the beginning of 
each stage, want to make their choices in light of the choices made by all firms in previous 
stages and their stage completion records to that time. 
We investigate how firms choose the aggressiveness of their product characteristics when 
there is a tradeoff between the aggressiveness of product characteristics and the speed with 
which the stages of R&D are completed, and when strategic interactions between firms are 
accounted for. While products with more aggressive characteristics are “better” in the sense 
that they earn the firm greater profits, the required R&D takes more time. This paper thus 
incorporates strategic considerations into the analysis of a problem, that of the way in which 
given resources are used in a sequential R&D context, that has hitherto been dealt with only in 
a decision theoretic fashion, lately in a stochastic version (Gottinger, 2001) We offer two sets 
of conclusions to build on the existing literature. First, in the two stage game (as, for example, 
in Grossman and Shapiro (1987) we demonstrate the importance of explicitly accounting for 
differences in product quality and cost. It is in the assumption of scarce resources for each 
stage (and the implied tradeoff between product aggressiveness and time to completion of 
R&D) that this analysis differs from previous analyses. Further, in situations of strategic 
rivalry, relative R&D resource endowment influences the pattern of resource utilisation, as 
does incumbency (Gilbert, 1989). These analyses are motivated by the empirical work 
described in Cebon et al.(2001). Secondly, this paper analyses the changing way in which 
R&D resources are used in a multi-stage game as one firm gets further ahead of the other, and 
as the firms' proximity to the last stage increases. Throughout, we abstract from “dropout 
behavior” (Lippman & McCardle (1987)). 
It should be stressed that it is not our purpose to analyse how firms vary the amount they 
spend on R&D as stages in the sequential game evolve (against nature or against a specific 
opponent). Rather, the issue is: how do firms use given resources in the face of the existence 
of a very natural tradeoff between the aggressiveness of product characteristics and the speed 
of execution. 
There are two sets of reasons why the resources available for R&D might be limited. The 
first interpretation has to do with the assumption that it is the budget available to R&D 
management that is fixed, and consequently limited use can be made of the services of 
engineers and scientists to do the R&D(even though there is a well developed market for such 
services). The second interpretation is that the resources available to do R&D (in technically 
complex, knowledge based industries)are firm specific and therefore subject to factor market 
imperfections. As Rubin(1973) points out, "...the value of a resource typically exceeds the 
market value of the individual parts due to the cohesiveness of the human part of the resource 
developed through mutual experience within the firm". In a similar vein, Camerer (1991) 
suggests that workers might be tied to a firm if they are productive together but cannot 
collectively agree to move to a better-paying firm. Thus scientists function best within (and 
are worth more in) the milieu in which much of their work on firm specific R&D has 
proceeded. The notion of resources being tied to a firm also implies that a firm cannot 
augment its resources easily. This 'resource based' view within the strategy literature (see 
Connor (1991) for a review) analyzes the effects of product market competition taking as  9 
given initial differences in firms resource endowments. Game theoretic advances (Fudenberg 
and Tirole, 1989, Tirole, 1988) also suggest foundations for the resource based view. For 
example, information asymmetries in the 'new industrial organization' (Jacquemin, 1987; 
Reinganum, 1989) might preclude the use of an asset outside the boundaries of the firm that 
owns the asset. Kreps (1990) suggests that in many situations where unforeseen contingencies 
arise, certain transactions are facilitated by the reputation of a trusted party, i.e. a firm. Thus a 
firm's resources might not be able to operate independently of the firm. The obvious question 
that the resource-based view leaves unanswered is that of how the firms came to acquire 
different endowments in the first place. Here again Rubin (1973) suggests that when resources 
are firm-specific, then existing resources will have to be used to augment the stock available 
for future use. Given the opportunity costs of engaging in such augmentation , different firms 
might opt for different augmentation rates. As such, at any point in time, different firms 
would have access to different resource endowments.  
 R&D resources are assumed to be firm specific. Further, each stage is assumed to have its 
own resource endowment (non-transferable across stages). This reflects our belief that the 
nature of work done by, say, other scientists in basic research, is considerably different from 
that done by, say, other scientists and engineers in development. Just as firms would incur 
significant costs in augmenting their R&D resources, so also deploying existing resources 
across the stages is also assumed to be very costly.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple model that will allow us 
to think about multiple stage racing and analyzes a two-stage interaction between symmetric 
firms. Section 3 elaborates on this analysis to consider some of the asymmetries that empirical 
work suggests are important (Cohen and Levin, 1989, Lerner, 1997). We show that an 
incumbent firm will choose more aggressively in each stage of the race than an entrant firm. 
We analyze factors that cause relatively resource rich firms to choose differently from 
resource poor ones. Finally , Section 4 is devoted to understanding how getting ahead (falling 
behind) alters the choices that a firm makes. We identify the importance of two factors : the 
magnitude of the lead that one firm has over the other, and the distance between the firms and 
the finish line and suggest that the patterns of resource allocation, in a situation where there is 
an aggressiveness-speed tradeoff, can be quite different from that suggested in the existing 
literature. Section 5 draws some conclusions and identifies some new research issues. 
 
2. A Model for Symmetric Firms 
Product development proceeds in a sequence of stages, each responsible for determining a 
particular characteristic of the product. Each stage involves a number of problem solving 
activities, split into two parts, 'research' and 'development', each of which improves the 
product characteristic being determined in that stage. The firm exercises discretion as to the 
extent to which the stage characteristic will be developed. At each stage, the firm has access 
to an exogeneously determined resource endowment (which cannot be transferred across 
stages) and has to target the set of activities over which it will allocate these resources. The 
larger the number of activities in the targeted set, the greater is the extent to which the stage 
characteristic is developed. However, the larger the number of targeted activities, the smaller 
will be the resource amount allocated to each activity, and the greater will be the expected 
time to completion of the activities in that stage. We will speak of a firm's target being more 
aggressive if its target set contains more activities.  10 
System complexity considerations are incorporated here by thinking of each problem 
solving activity in a stage as linked to every other problem solving activity in that stage. We 
assume that the stage specific resource is divided equally among the activities in the targeted 
set and that the problems cannot be solved independent of each other. Thus, at any point in 
time, the targeted set of problems has either been completely solved or not at all. Let the 
hazard rate for solving the targeted set of problems be denoted 'h'.
1 Then a higher hazard rate 
is obtained by allocating more resources to each activity, which implies consideration of 
fewer activities. Thus a higher hazard rate implies a less aggressive target set. 
In this section, we model a two-firm, two-stage interaction. Each firm has two choices for 
the degree of aggressiveness of its product characteristics in each stage. The choice of the 
higher rate 'x' in a stage gives the firm a less aggressive stage target, while the choice of the 
lower hazard rate 'y' corresponds to a more aggressive stage target. While there is uncertainty 
in the time taken to achieve a particular target, the target itself is chosen at the beginning of 
each stage. Let pR, qR be the choices of hazard rate by firms 1 and 2 respectively for the first 
stage (hereafter, RES stage). Similarly, let firms 1 and 2 choose hazard rates   pD, qD 
respectively for the second stage (hereafter, DEV stage). At time 0, firm 1 chooses pR = x or 
pR = y, while firm 2 simultaneously chooses qR = x or qR = y. Assume, without loss of 
generality, that the first firm to finish the RES stage is firm 2. Then firm 2 will choose qD = x 
or qD = y as its hazard rate for the DEV stage. Finally, when firm 1 is done with stage RES 
(which may or may not be before firm 2 has finished stage DEV) it will choose pD = x or 
pD = y.  
For most of the paper (except in parts of Section 3), we will employ the following reduced 
form expression for the payoffs received by firms as a function of pR. pD, qR, qD . Payoffs will 
depend on the “points” accumulated by a firm. Firm 1’s points are as follows 
      pR< qR Þ 2 points, pR= qR Þ1 point, pR>qR Þ 0 points 
      pD< qD Þ 2 points, pD= qD Þ 1 point, pD>qD Þ 0 points 
Firm 2’s points are determined analogously. Thus, a firm has more points the more 
aggressive is its target relative to that of its rival. The notion that more aggressive targets lead 
to higher profits is reflected in the assumption that a higher point score leads to greater profits. 
Monopoly profits do not depend on the relative merits of the products, since consumers do not 
have a choice between products when only one firm has finished R&D. Accordingly, 
monopoly profits are denoted M(pR, pD) or M(qR, qD) and not as a function of points. We 
abstract from 'dropout behaviour' and assume that both firms will eventually finish the 
multiple stages. Since we are concerned with the utilisation of given R&D resources, flow 
 
1   The hazard rate function should be interpreted thus. h(t) denotes the instantaneous conditional probability of 
completion of a stage that has lasted until time t. Formally, h(t)/f(t)/(1-F(t)) for any continuous random 
variable having distribution F(t) and density f(t). For an exponentially distributed random variable with 
parameter m>0, 
   f(t)=me
-mt,  
  and the hazard rate, h(t)=m, is a constant for all t.   11 
costs of R&D are fixed regardless of the level of aggressiveness chosen. We do not explicitly 
include this flow cost term in our expressions. Firms are risk neutral and maximise discounted 
expected profits, with r denoting the discount rate. We will look for a subgame-perfect 
equilibrium in this game (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1989). The solution proceeds by backwards 
induction in three steps, which we turn to after discussing the notation that we will employ. 
Notation: For algebraic convenience, we will employ the notation described here. Let W(i) 
be the expected payoff for a firm when it has finished stage DEV with i points while its rival 
is still in its DEV stage (having completed its RES stage). Then, for firm 1, we would write 
 rW(i)  =  M(pR, pD) + qD (D(i) – W(i)) Þ W(i) = 
) (








where M(pR, pD),  D(i) denote monopoly, duopoly profits 
Analogously, when W(i) refers to a payoff for firm 2, it is given by  
  [M(qR, qD) +  pDD(i)]/(r +pD).  
Similarly, let L(i) be the expected payoff for a firm when it is still in stage DEV, which it 
will finish with i points, when its rival has already finished its DEV stage. Then, for firm 1, 
we would write 









Analogously, when L(i) refers to a payoff for firm 2, it is given by [qD(D(i)]/(r + qD). We 
assume W'(i) > 0, L'(i) > 0. Occasionally, we will write the monopoly profit term without its 
arguments for convenience. The reduced form expressions that we analyse are in terms of 
W(i) and L(i). However, we will reinterpret the propositions in terms of monopoly and 
duopoly profit terms. This translation between the W(i), L(i) notation and the monopoly, 
duopoly notation will be accomplished using the following lemmas. 
For convenience, define the quantity T(q) = q/(r + q-1). 
 
Lemma 1: For any value of points i , if monopoly profits with less aggressive actions in each 
of the RES  and DEV stages exceeds T(y)D(i), then (a) M > W(i) for all x, y combinations 
that map into i. (b) W(i) > L(i). Further, the greater is M(x,x)/D(i), the greater are the ratios 
M(x,x)/W(i) and W(i)/L(i). 
Proof: see appendix 1. 
 
Lemma 2: The following conditions 
  yD (i+1) > xD(i),           yM(y,v) > xM(x, v)     where v = x,y 
are sufficient to ensure that  12 
  yL(i + 1) > xL(i),                   yW(i + 1) > xW(i) 
 
Proof: follows directly from the expressions 
 
Lemma 3: Even when M is greater than W(i), L(i) in the sense of Lemma 1, there exist ranges 
of values of x and y such that the following conditions are compatible 
 
  xW(i) < yW(i + 1),        xL(i) < yL(i + 1),         xM(.,x) > yM(. , y) 
 
Proof: see appendix 1 
 
We turn now to the backwards induction. A firm's strategy consists of its choices; of 
hazard rate (and hence level of aggressiveness) in each of the two stages. Without loss of 
generality, we assume that firm 2 is the first firm to finish the RES stage. Then the game can 
be solved in three parts. Part 3, which we analyse first, corresponds to the situation where 
both firms have had their RES stage choices, firm 2 has made its DEV stage choice, and firm 
1 has to make its DEV stage choice. Part 2 corresponds to the part of the game where firm 1 is 
still in its RES stage, while firm 2 has just finished its RES stage and has to make its DEV 
stage choice. Part 2 is solved taking as given the results of the Part 3 solution by backwards 
induction. Finally, Part 1 refers to the part of the game where both firms simultaneously make 
their RES stage choices. We solve Part 1 for specific cases that we identify from the analysis 
of Parts 2 and 3. 
 
Part 3 
Here firm 1 chooses its DEV stage strategy, pD, given its own previous choice of pR, firm 
2’s choice of qR and qD , and information regarding whether firm 2 has completed its DEV 
stage or not. (Recall that we assumed that firm 2 was the first to finish the RES stage. 
Consequently, when firm 1 has to choose pD, we know that firm 2 has already finished its 
RES stage and has chosen qD.) There are two cases to consider depending on whether firm 2 
has completed its DEV stage or not. 
First consider the case where firm 2 has not yet competed its DEV stage. Then firm 1's 
expected payoff S1,a(i) is given by 
 rS1,a(i)  = pD (W(i) – S1,a(i)) + qD(L(i) – S1,a(i)) 
  Þ S1,a(i) = 
) (




i L q i W p
+ +
+
  13 
Now, firm 1 chooses pD = x or pD= y to maximize this expression for various realizations 
of pR, qR, qD (i.e. all the previous decisions made by the firms). As an example, consider firm 
1’s best response to the triple (pR, qR, qD) = (y, y, x). Then for pD = y to be preferred (   ) to 
pD= x, we need S1,a(i +1) when pD = y to be greater than S1,a(i) when pD= x. So 
   y      x Þ 
) y 2 r (




) y x r (




Here, on the LHS, pR = qR, pD< qD implies that firm 1 has 3 points. On the RHS, pR = qR , 
pD = qD implies that firm 1 has 2 points. A sufficient condition for this inequality to hold is 
that xW(2) £ yW(3). More generally, 
 xW(i)  £  yW(i + 1) " i Þ y     x  " (pR, qR, qD) 
Now consider the case where firm 2 has completed its DEV stage. Then firm 1's expected 
payoff is given by S1,b(i) where 









So for pD = y to be preferred to pD = x, we need 















 xL(i)  £ yL(i + 1) " i Þ y     x  " (pR, qR). 
In summary, when xW(i) £ yW(i + 1), xL(i) £ yL(I + 1) for all i, firm 1 will choose pD = y 
regardless of whether firm 2 has completed its DEV stage or not. 
 
Part 2 
Prior to firm 1 choosing its DEV stage strategy , firm 2 is the first firm to finish the RES 
stage and has to choose  qD given  (pR, qR) and given firm 1's actions as determined by 
conditions in Part 1 of the backward induction. 
Let us define W2 as firm 2’s expected payoff if it finishes stage DEV before firm 1 finishes 
stage RES. 
         rW2(i) = pR(W(i)–W2(i)) + M(qR, qD) 
  Þ W2(i) =  [M(qR, qD) + pR W(i) ]/ (r + pR) 
Similarly, let L2 be firm 2’s expected payoff if it finishes stage DEV after firm 1 finishes 
stage RES. Then  14 
 rL2 (i) = qD(W(i)-L2 (i) + pD(L(i) – L2 (i)) 
  Þ L2 (i) = 
) (








Here W(i) and L(i) are the quantities from Part 3 of the backward induction and refer to 
payoffs received by firm 2. Recall from Part 3 that xW(i) £ yW(i+ 1), xL(i) £yL(i + 1) for all i 
implies that firm 1 chooses pD = y regardless of whether firm 1 chooses its DEV stage 
strategy before or after firm 2 finishes its DEV stage. So firm 1's action is the same in the two 
cases whose payoffs (for firm 2) are represented by W2(i) and L2(i). Thus both W2(i) and L2(i) 
have the same index as argument. 
Now, firm 2 chooses qD to maximize S2(i) where 
 rS2(i) = qD(W2(i)-S2(i)) + pD(L2(í) –S2(i)) 
  ÞS2(i) = 
) (




i L p i W q
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Substituting W2(i) and L2(i) into S2, we have 
 S 2(i) =  ) ( ]
) (
) ( ) (
[ ]
) (
) ( ) , (
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Let k1 = 2r+pR+pD and k2 = r+pD. Then S2(i) can be rewritten as 
 
) )( )( (
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p r p p i L q q q M q q q M k q i W p q i W k p
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Let us compare the magnitudes that the various terms in this expression for S2(i) take on 
for firm 2’ two possible choices of qD. We see that the denominator term increases if qD = x is 
chosen instead of qD= y. The L term in the numerator takes on the value pDpR (r+pR)L(i) when 
qD = x and pDpR(r + pR)L(i+1) when qD=y, and is therefore larger when qD= y. Thus both the 
L term in the numerator and the reciprocal of the denominator are larger when qD = y than 
when qD = x. We need the following assumptions to ensure that the other numerator terms are 
at least as large when qD = y than when qD=x. 
 x
2W(i) £ y
2W(i+1) " i. x
2 M (qR,x) £ y
2M (qR,y) for qR = x,y  (*) 
Recall from the Part 3 analysis above that xW(i) £ yW(i+1), xL(i) £ yL(i + 1) for all i 
implied that firm 1 would set pD = y regardless of firm 2's choice of qD. When these 
conditions hold, the inequalities in (*) above are sufficient to ensure that qD = y is a dominant 
strategy for firm 2. 
We now want to establish sufficient conditions for firm 2 to choose qD = x. For x to be 
chosen, S2 with qD = x should be greater than S2 when qD = y. If Tc1 is a term that includes all 
non-monopoly terms in the inequality that expresses this comparison, then the relevant 














This can be re-expressed as 
 
Condition C1: 
  q<  ), 1 (





















This condition is more likely to hold the closer q is to l. Note that Tc1 may be positive or 
negative. However, the second term on the right hand side of the inequality has less of an 
effect the greater is the monopoly profit term, M(., x), relative to the terms in Tc1,. Note also 
that the first term on the right hand side is greater than 1. 
The above analysis of Parts 3 and 2 of the backwards induction can be summarised as 
follows: 
Part 3: (Action when a firm is the last firm to finish RES stage and is the last to choose its 
DEV stage strategy) 
- Sufficient conditions to choose y: 
                      xW(i) £ yW(i + l), xL(i) £ yL (i + 1) " i  
Part 2: (Action when a firm is the first firm to finish the RES stage and is the first to choose 
its DEV stage strategy) 
- Sufficient conditions to choose y: 
   x
2W(i) £ y
2W(i + 1) " i, x
2M(v, x) £ y
2M(v, y) v = x,y 
- Sufficient conditions to choose x: 
Condition C1 holds. 




2W(I + 1) xL(i) £ yL(I + 1) " i, x
2 M(v, x) £ y
2M(v, y) ,v = x, y 
In Case 1, the conditions specified are sufficient to ensure that firms always choose y when 
they complete the RES stage. Lemma 2 suggests that these Case I conditions will hold when 
both duopoly and monopoly profit terms are sufficiently larger under the more aggressive 
strategy choice (than under the less aggressive choice) to overcome the effect of the longer 
expected time to completion under the more aggressive choice.  16 
Case II: 
 xW(i)  £ yW (i + 1), xL(i) £ yL(i + 1), xM(v, x) > yM(v, y), v = x, y 
and condition C1 holds. 
In Case II, the conditions specified are sufficient to ensure that the first firm to finish the 
RES stage chooses x, while the second firm to finish the RES stage chooses y. Lemma 3 
shows that ranges of x and y exist such that these conditions are satisfied. 
 
Part 1  
In the game's initial stage, both firms simultaneously choose hazard rates for the RES 
stage. After introducing some preliminaries, we shall solve separately for the two cases 
identified by the backwards induction thus far. 
Let V1 denote firm 1's expected payoff if it finishes the RES stage first and subsequent play 
is optimal, and let  1 V , denote its expected payoff if it finishes the RES stage second and 
subsequent play is optimal. Then firm 1's overall expected payoff, P1, is given by 










Since we have already derived an expression for firm 2's expected payoff if it finished RES 
first (called S2, in Part 2 of the backwards induction), we can interchange p's and q's to get an 
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Firm 1 will maximise P1 with pD and qD set by backwards induction. Thus the index i 
associated with the pD term in the numerator of V1 should assume that firm 1 finished the RES 
stage first, while the corresponding index j for the qR term should assume that firm 1 finished 
the RES stage second. However, for exactly the same reason that W2 and L2 in Part 2 of the 
backwards induction shared the same index as their argument, we have i = j here. In all 
subsequent references to V1, the common index will be denoted by i. Also 
 ) ( ) ( 1 1 1
- - -
- + - = V q V A p V r D R z   
where  
A = firm 1's payoff when it has finished stage RES but rival hasn’t finished stage DEV 
z  = firm 1's payoff when it hasn’t finished stage RES but rival has finished stage DEV 
Then the terms in the expression can be calculated as follows  17 







where B = firm 1's payoff when it has finished  stage RES ,rival has finished stage DEV 
Also  

















This leads to the following expression 
  = 1 V
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where A, B are as above 
Case I: 
Recall that this is the case where the first firm to finish the RES stage chooses y, as does 
the second. We want to look for Firm 1's best response to the choices of qR by firm 2. First 
suppose that qR = y. When pR = x, P1 is given by 
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Here V1(i) is what firm 1 gets if it finishes the RES stage first. Then pR = x, qR = y, pD = y, 
qD = y, and the index i = 1. Similarly, V1(j) is what firm 1 gets if it finishes the RES stage last. 
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and the indices are k = 2 and 1= 2. So, when qR = y, 
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So, firm 1 chooses pR = y when qR = y if yV1(2)³xV1(1). 
Now, consider the case where qR = x. By proceeding as above, we have 
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So firm 1 chooses pR = y when qR = x if yV1(3) )³ xV1(2).  18 
Combining these results, we can say that xV1(i)£yV1(i + 1) for i=1,2 is  a sufficient 
condition for y to be a dominant strategy for firm 1 in stage RES. 
Let us check how this condition relates to the Case I conditions. When pD = qD = y (as in 
Case I), for the case where qR = y, we can rewrite yV1(i + 1)³ xV1(i), after some 
manipulation, as 
  y(r + 2y) [yM(y, y) - xM(x, y)] + y
2 (2r + 3y) [yW(i + 1) - xW(i)] 
 +  y
2  (r + y) [yL(i + 1) - xL(i)] ³ 0  (**) 
Now, recall that under Case I assumptions, yW(I + 1) ³ xW(i), yL(I + 1) ³ xL(i) for all i. 
So the only additional assumption required to make (**) hold is that yM(y, y) ³ xM(x, y). We 
can also verify that no additional assumptions are required to make yV1(i + 1) ³ xV1(i) hold 
when qR = x. So we have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: When the following conditions hold 
    x
2W(i) £ y
2W(i + 1), xL(i) ) £ yL(i + 1) "i, 
 x
2M(v, x) £ y
2M(v, y), v = x, y , xM(x, y) £ yM(y, y) 
both firms choosing aggressive strategies (y) in each of the RES and DEV stages constitutes a 
subgame perfect equilibrium. 
The conditions in this proposition can be reinterpreted using Lemma 2. They are the same 
as saying that both monopoly and duopoly profits are sufficiently larger when the aggressive
2 
option is chosen to outweigh the cost of achieving these higher profits at a later (expected) 
date. So this proposition simply establishes that if the advantages to introducing a better 
product are high enough to outweigh the benefits of introducing the product sooner, then both 
firms will opt for the aggressive targets in both stages. 
Case II: 
Recall that this is the case where the first firm to finish the RES stage chooses its DEV 
stage strategy to be x, while the second chooses y. We can now rule out an equilibrium where 
one firm does x in the RES stage, and the other does y in the RES stage, when the condition 
C1 (under which Case II arises) holds. Let us develop a condition as we did condition C1 in 
Part 2. Consider firm 1's response to qR = x. We have to compare the payoff P1 when pR = y 
with that when pR = x. Let Tc2 be the term that includes all non-monopoly terms in the 
inequality that expresses this comparison. Then the relevant condition for pR = y to be chosen 
in response to qR = x is 
 
2   To see this, note that if TC1 and TC2 are small enough so that their terms can be ignored in conditions C1 and 
C3, then condition C1 implies condition C3.  19 













This can be restated as 
Condition C2: 
























q    
While TC2 may be positive or negative, the TC2 term in the condition C2 inequality has less 
of an effect the greater is the monopoly profit term, M(x,x), relative to the terms in TC2. Note 
also that the first term (FT) on the right hand side is greater than 1. Then the condition C2 
inequality can be approximated by q > FT. This is less likely to hold the closer q is to 1. But q 
was required to be close to 1 to make condition C1 hold (which is the condition under which 
we are in Case II). So conditions C1 and C2 cannot hold simultaneously. 
Now define Condition C3 to be condition C2 with a reversal in the inequality. Then 
condition C3 is likely to hold under the same conditions that condition C1 held.
2 When 
condition C3 holds, firm 1 will choose pR = x in response to firm 2’s choice of qR = x. We can 
now state the following proposition. 
Proposition 2: When Conditions C1 and C3 hold and 
 xW(i)  £ yW(i + 1), xL(i) £ yL(i + 1) " i 
then both firms choosing x in the RES stage, the first firm to finish RES choosing x in the 
DEV stage, and the second to finish RES choosing y in the DEV stage, constitute a subgame 
perfect equilibrium. 
Lemma 3 established that the conditions under which this result holds are indeed met for 
some parameter values
3. The intuition behind this proposition is as follows. When the 
monopoly profits are large enough and do not vary much with the product characteristics, 
both firms choose the strategy that will enable them to introduce the product quickly. 
However, following the introduction of the product by one firm (or even the getting ahead of 
one firm), the rival finds it advantageous to choose the more aggressive (& slower) option in 
the latter stage since the duopoly profits do vary enough with the quality of the product to 
make the delayed introduction worthwhile. An example of such a situation is as follows. 
Demand inelasticity implies that aggressive cost reduction (and associated long product 
development times) is not optimal. Bertrand competition implies that the only way to earn any 
profits when there is a rival is to have a product that is superior on some stage characteristic. 
So both firms will start by trying to become the monopolist with the less aggressive strategy, 




3   Both Lemma 1 and Condition C1 hold if M(. ,x) and M(.,y) are close enough such that xM(.,x)>yM(.,y)  20 
In these two results, symmetric firms choose identically in the RES stage. Depending on 
whether monopoly profits are large enough or not, they will either choose the quicker strategy 
or the more aggressive (slower) strategy. Whereas in the situation analyzed in Proposition 1, 
firms are aggressive in the DEV stage regardless of the order in which they finished the RES 
stage, in the Proposition 2 situation, whether a firm is aggressive or not in the DEV stage 
depends on whether it finishes the RES stage last or  first
4. The underlying notion is that a 
firm that gets ahead and closer to the finish line makes different choices from a firm that falls 
behind. We shall return to develop this notion further in the context of multi-stage races. 
 
3. Models for Asymmetric Firms 
In this section, we modify the analysis of the two-firm two-stage game in Section 2 to 
consider two kinds of asymmetries between firms that our empirical work has suggested is 
important. The notation used here parallels that used above. 
Of the two cases considered in Section 2 ,Case II is more appropriate to the industry setting 
in which  empirical work was focussed on because of two characteristics of the mainframe 
(server)computer industry. Historically most mainframe sales have been to large institutions 
whose sole criterion is typically to buy the mainframe with the highest available performance. 
New generation mainframes have typically surpassed previous generations' performance. A 
firm that finds itself the first to introduce a new generation mainframe will be able to sell its 
product regardless of the exact performance that its new generation mainframe attains. In 
other words, monopoly profits (where a monopolist should be thought of as the sole producer 
of a new generation mainframe) with less aggressive characteristics are not very different 
from monopoly profits with more aggressive characteristics. In our model, this is a factor that 
increases the likelihood of condition C1 holding (part of the Case II assumptions). The second 
industry characteristic is that of intense competition when more than one producer has a 
product on the market. This, together with the fact that the mainframe customer base has 
remained fairly stable, translates into monopoly profits being considerably greater than 
duopoly profits. Lemma 1 suggests that this is another factor that increases the likelihood of 
condition C1 holding. The remaining Case II assumptions simply say, by Lemma 2, that when 
there is duopoly competition, it pays to choose the more aggressive targets. 
For the analysis of the incumbent-entrant interaction, we shall make the assumptions under 
which Case II holds. For the analysis of the interaction between firms with differing 




4    The result depends upon homogeneity of consumer preferences. We can construct an example of the 
following form to show this.Suppose some consumers prefer high performance products while others put 
greater value on lower price. Then, when there is strong product market competition, a segmented 
equilibrium can result in that one firm chooses an aggressive option in the first research stage, while the rival 
chooses aggressively in the second stage but not in the first stage.In equilibrium, one firm serves the high 
performance preferring consumers, while the other serves te consumers who value lower price.  21 
3. 1.  Incumbent-Entrant Asymmetry 
Let firm 1 be an incumbent firm that  chooses hazard rates pR, pD, in the RES and DEV 
stages respectively, and let firm 2 be an entrant that chooses hazard rates qR, qD similarly. The 
incumbent earns flow rents I from its existing product, which cease to accrue to it once the 
new product is introduced by either firm. We will analyse this incumbent-entrant interaction 
by backwards induction in the same manner as in Section 2. 
The conditions governing the actions of the entrant firm are the same as those discussed in 
the symmetric case in Section 2. Following the discussion at the beginning of this section, let 
us assume that the sufficient conditions hold under which the entrant chooses qD = y if it is the 
last to finish the RES stage and qD = x if it is the first firm to finish the RES stage (Case II of 
Section 2). Recall that these were derived in Parts 3 and 2 of the backwards induction in 
Section 2. We need xW(i)£yW(i+1),xL(i)£yL(i+1) for all i, and Condition C1 should hold. 
Now we turn to analyzing the incumbent's choice of actions. 
Part 3 
Suppose the incumbent is the last to finish the RES stage. If, at the time of its choosing pD, 
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For pD = y to be preferred to pD = x, the following inequality must hold  
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This can be rewritten as 
  I(x - y) + (r + qD) [yW(i + 1) - xW(i)] + xy [W(i + 1) - W(i)] + 
 q D(r + qD)[L(i + 1) - L(i)] + qD [xL (i +1) - yL(i)] > 0 
When yW(I + 1) ³ xW(i) for all i, this inequality bolds and the incumbent chooses pD = y 
regardless of the entrant's choice of qD. 
If, at the time of the incumbent's choice of pD, the entrant has finished the DEV stage, then 














Here pD = y is preferred to pD = x if yL(I + 1) ³ xL(i) for all i. 
  22 
Part 2 
If the incumbent is the first firm to finish the RES stage, calculations similar to those in the 
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We can establish conditions under which the incumbent chooses pD = y as follows. Let TC4 
include all non flow-profit (I) terms in the inequality that compares S
I
2  when pD = y with S
I
2 
when pD = x. Then the relevant condition for pD = y to be chosen is 
Condition C4: 
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Here the qD term is the same in E and F because the entrant's DEV stage action, when it is 
the second to finish the RES stage, does not depend on the incumbent's choice of pD. This 
follows from the assumptions made at the beginning of the backwards induction. 
In condition C4, the non TC4 terms are of the form      
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It follows that condition C4 will hold when I is large enough relative to the terms in TC4, 
regardless of the sign of TC4. Then the incumbent chooses pD = y when it is the first to finish 
the RES stage regardless of the entrant's choice of qD. 
  23 
Part 1 
Now we discuss the incumbent's choice of pR in the RES stage. Let V
I denote the 
incumbent's payoff if it finishes the RES stage before the entrant, and subsequent play is 
optimal, and let  6
I  denote the incumbent's payoff if it finishes the RES stage after the entrant, 
and subsequent play is optimal. Let P
I denote the incumbent's payoff when it has to choose its 
strategy pR for the RES stage. Then proceeding as in Part 1 of the backwards induction in 
Section 2, we have 
  p
I (i) = 
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I(i) are the analogues of  VI(i)  and  6I(i) in Part 1 of the earlier 
backwards induction. We can show that, when the I term in the expressions for V
I(i) and 6
I(i)  
is large relative to the other terms, then we can approximate for V
I(i) and 6
I(i)  by the 
following 
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I(i) is what the incumbent gets when it finishes the RES stage first, plug in pD = y, 
qD  = y into its expression. Similarly, since 6
I(i)   is what the incumbent gets when it finishes 
the RES stage second, plug in pD = y, qD= x into its expression. Then we have  
  V
I(i) = I  i
p x r y x r
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Substitute these terms into the expression for P
I. Substitute also qR = x to see what the 
incumbent's best response is to the entrant choosing the less aggressive strategy in the RES 
stage. Then we have 
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Numerical simulations show that the incumbent's best response to the entrant’s choice of 
qR = x is “usually” to choose pR = y. Further, by exactly the same reasoning as in Case II of 
the symmetric firm interaction in Section 2, Condítion C3 implies that qR = x is a dominant 
strategy for the entrant in the RES stage. The conditions that we have accumulated in 
establishing this equilibrium include xW(i) £ yW(i + I), xL(i)£ yL(i + 1) for all i, and that 
Conditions C1 and C3 should hold. But these are exactly the conditions in Proposition 2. So 
we can state the following proposition. 
Proposition 3: When Condition C4 holds and the conditions in Proposition 2 hold, then the 
following constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium. The incumbent chooses y in each of the 
RES and DEV stages. The entrant chooses x in the RES stage, x in the DEV stage if it is the 
first to finish the RES stage, and y in the DEV stage if it is the second to finish the RES stage.  24 
The entrant behaves exactly as it did in the symmetric firm interaction. 
When monopoly profits are large enough and do not vary much with the product 
characteristics, the entrant chooses the faster, less aggressive option in each stage as long as it 
has not fallen behind in the race. The incumbent's behavior is influenced by what the literature 
identifies as the “replacement effect" (sec, eg, Tirole (1988), Chapter 10). The conventional 
“replacement effect” says that, in an effort to maximize the discounted value of its existing 
profit stream, an incumbent monopolist invests less in R&D than an entrant, and thus expects 
to be replaced by the entrant (in the case where the innovation is drastic enough that the firm 
with the older technology would not find it profitable to compete with the newer technology). 
In our model, when the incumbent's flow profits are large enough to make condition C4 hold, 
this same replacement effect causes the incumbent to be replaced only temporarily (if the 
innovation is drastic). Subsequently it regains a dominant position in the market since it has a 
superior version of the new technology. 
In the usual models, investing more simply shortens your expected time to discovery; what 
you discover is always the same (i.e. the patent value is not a function of the amount 
invested). The difference in our model arises because trying to accelerate discovery implies 
that the innovation will be inferior in some sense (i.e. the analog to the patent, the value of the 
innovation, is a function of the firm’s investment strategy). This result flows from the more 
realistic assumption that in developing products as complex as mainframe computers, the 
R&D resources at the firm's disposal are fixed. The relevant question then is not how much 
you invest, but how you allocate what you do have at your disposal. 
Recall that our empirical analyses had shown a strong correlation between our measure of 
incumbency and the degree of aggressiveness of firms’ targets. This is in accord with what 
Proposition 3 suggests. The incumbent always chooses the more aggressive targets, while 
the entrant chooses the less aggressive target in the RES stage. Further, the probability that the 
entrant chooses the less aggressive target in the DEV stage as well is x/(x + y) > 0.5. 
 
3. 2. Resource Endowment Asymmetries 
In the model setup in Section 2, we  suggested that each stage involves a number of 
interdependent problem solving activities. We incorporated the idea of system complexity by 
thinking of each activity as being linked to every other activity in the stage. So a choice of a 
target set is simultaneously a choice of the number of links that are included within the target 
set. A target of n activities involves a maximum of C2 = n(n-1)/2 links, in standard 
combinatorial notation. Let us assume that the extent to which a stage characteristic is 
developed is an increasing function of the maximum number of links in the target set. 
Recall that the larger the number of activities in the targeted set, the smaller will be the 
resource amount allocated to each activity. Since it is the resources allocated per activity that 
determines the hazard rate, a larger number of activities in the target set also implies a greater 
expected time to completion of the activities in that stage. Note also that, for a given choice of 
hazard rate, the target set is larger the greater is the firm's resource endowment. 
Formally, let s(B, h), sB > 0, sh < 0, denote the extent to which a stage characteristic is 
developed when B is the stage specific resource endowment and h the choice of the stage  25 
hazard rate. In this section, we will sometimes refer to monopoly profits as being a function of 
s(B,h). This simply makes explicit the earlier implicit assumption that monopoly profit is a 
function of the resource endowment B, in addition to being a function of the chosen hazard 
rate. 
Our model of stage specific problem solving activities leads us to the system complexity 
assumption (SCA) below. A given resource increment allows the larger target set to expand 
more than the smaller one The maximum number of links in the target set also increascs as the 
target set gets larger. The SCA says that this increase in the number of links, as a proportion 
of the number of links in an existing target set, is greater the larger is the existing target set. 
 
System Complexity Assumption (SCA): 
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For ease of exposition, the following lemma specializes to particular reduced forms for 
monopoly profit. Later we suggest that this restriction to specific forms is more severe than 
necessary. Also, for notational convenience, we will sometimes refer to the monopoly profit 
function as though it depends only on the choice of hazard rate in one stage. This is not 
crucial to the analysis in any way. 
Lemma 4: When the SCA holds, a range of reduced form monopoly payoff functions of the 
form M = Ks (B, h), K = constant, q is any power, satisfy 
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Proof: see appendix 1. 
The SCA, together with the fact that sB > 0, sh < 0, also implies that sBh  <  0. Therefore,   




[s,(B,y)-s(B,x)]  >  0 
So, the increase in the extent to which a stage characteristic is developed, as we go from a 
higher to a lower hazard rate, is greater for a firm that has a greater resource endowment. 
Furthermore, for any given choice of hazard rate, the resource rich firm can undertake more 
activities in any stage. To capture these two effects of resource asymmetry, the “points” 
system used in the symmetric interaction is revised as follows. 
  Resource Poor   Resource Rich 
pR < qR 2  5 
pR = qR 1  3 
pR > pR  0  1  26 
The points allocated to the resource poor firm are the same as in the symmetric interaction. 
Proceeding by backwards induction as before, we can summarize sufficient conditions for the 
resource rich firm's choices in Parts 3 and 2 as below (the conditions for the resource poor 
firm are as in Section 2). 
Part 3:   (Action when the resource rich firm is the last firm to finish the RES stage and is the 
last to choose its DEV stage strategy) 
- Sufficient conditions to choose y:  
   xW(i)  £ yW(i+2), xL(i) £ yL(i+2) " i 
Part 2:  (Action when the resource rich firm is the first firm to finish the RES stage and is the 
first to choose its DEV stage strategy) 
- Sufficient conditions to choose y: 
   x
2W(i) £ y
2W(i+2) " i, x
2M(v,x) £ y
2M(v,y), v = x,y  
- Sufficient conditions to choose x: 
Condition C1 holds. 
We can consider cases analogous to Cases I and II in Section 2. Proceeding as in the 
previous section, we can show that the results in Part 1 of the backward induction are also the 
same as in the symmetric firm game. Thus, in the analogue to Case I, both the resource rich 
firm and the resource poor firm choose the aggressive strategies in each of the RES and DEV 
stages. In the analogue to Case II, the first firm to finish the RES stage chooses the faster, less 
aggressive strategy, while the second to finish the RES stage chooses the more aggressive 
strategy. Thus, these two cases correspond to situations where the sufficient conditions 
specified are strong enough to obscure the effect of the resource endowment asymmetry. 
A more interesting situation arises when the effect of the asymmetry is not obscured. We 
will now analyze this case by backwards induction in our usual three parts. 
 
Part 3 
If xW(i) £ yW(i + 2), xL(i) £ yL(i + 2) for all i, then the resource rich firm, will choose y 
as its DEV stage strategy if it is the second to finish the RES stage. Now consider conditions 
under which the resource poor firm chooses x in Part 3. Let us suppose that the resource poor 
firm is firm 1 and has to choose pD for firm 2’s choice of qD. Then, paralleling the Section 2 
discussion, there are two cases to consider depending on whether firm 2 has completed its 
DEV stage at the time of firm 1's choice of pD or not. If firm 2 has not completed its DEV 
stage, then firm 1 will choose pD = x if 
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This can be rewritten as  27 
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where Tc5 denotes the terms in L. If firm 2 bas completed its DEV stage, then firm 1 will 

















Now let us collect all the conditions on the W and L terms to get 
 
Condition C5: 
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If Tc5 is small, this amounts to making the following assumption on the ranges in which 
xW(i) and xL(i) lie for all i 
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So condition C5 simply collects assumptions under which the "points" assumption to 




In Part 2 of the backwards induction in Section 2, we showed that condition C1 was 
sufficient to ensure that firm 2 choose x to be its DEV stage strategy if it found that it was the 
first firm to finish the RES stage. We can similarly argue that if the inequality in condition C1 
is reversed, then the firm finishing the RES stage first will choose y as its DEV stage strategy. 
To write this more formally, let us adopt the convention that M
rich(pR, pD) and M
poor(pR, pD) 
refer to the monopoly profits of the resource rich and the resource poor firm respectively for 
given choices of hazard rates pR and pD. Then we can write a modified condition C1RA (where 
the subscript “RA” is intended to denote the case of “resource asymmetries”) 
  28 
Condition C1RA 
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By lemma 4, a small enough DEV stage resource endowment for the resource poor firm 
and a large enough DEV stage resource endowment for the rescource rich firm will ensure 
that this condition holds. Also, as in condition C1, TCl may be positive or negative. However, 
the larger are monopoly profits relative to T, the less is the effect of the Tc1 term. When 
condition C1RA holds, there exist resource endowment asymmetries such that the resource 
poor firm would choose x as its DEV stage strategy if it was the first to finish the RES stage, 
while the resource rich firm would choose y as its DEV stage strategy if it was the first to 
finish the RES  stage (i.e. in Part 2 of the backwards induction). Note that the resource 
endowment asymmetry being discussed here refers to the endowment available to each firm in 
the DEV stage. 
Summarizing Parts 3 and 2, when conditions C1RA and C5 hold, the resource rich firm will 




Now we analyze the choices that each firm makes for its RES stage strategy (Part 1 of the 
backwards induction). As in the analysis of Part 1 in Seetion 2, we shall examine firm 1's 
decision, alternately adopting the perspective that the resource rich firm or the resource poor 
firm is firm 1. Let P1
rich and P1
poor refer to the expected payoffs of the resource rich and the 
resource poor firm respectively at the beginning of the RES stage (analogous to P1 in Part 1 in 
Section 2). 
First suppose that firm 1 is the resource poor firm. Then 
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where T denotes the non monopoly terms in the expression. Since this is the resource poor 
firm and condition C5 holds, set pD = x. Look at the best response to the resource rich firm’s 


















1   29 
We see that the resource poor firm will choose pR = x in stage RES, when the rich firm 






















where TC6 collects the non-monopoly terms in the inequality. We can state this as  
 
Condition C6: 
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By lemma 4, the left hand side of condition C6 will be small enough to make condition C6 
hold if the poor firm has a small enough RES stage resource endowment and if the monopoly 
terms M
poor (x, x) is large enough relative to the terms in TC6. 
Now suppose that firm 1 is the resource rich firm. Proceeding exactly as above, we can 
show that it will choose pR = y in response to the resource poor firm's choice of qR = x if the 
following condition holds. 
 
Condition C7: 
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By lemma 4, the left hand side of condition C7 will be large enough to make condition C7 
hold if the rich firm has a large enough RES stage resource endowment and if the monopoly 
term M
rich(x, y) is large enough relative to the terms in TC7. 
Now we can state the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4. If monopoly profits are of a form that satisfy lemma 4, and if conditions C1RA, 
C5, C6 and C7 hold, then the resource rich firm chooses y in each of the RES and DEV 
stages, while the resource poor firm chooses x in each of the RES and DEV stages. 
Recall that conditions C1RA, C6 and C7 are satisfied when there is sufficient resource 
asymmetry for the resource endowments in each of the RES and DEV stages. These 
conditions are all more likely to hold when the monopoly terms are larger than the  30 
non-monopoly terms in the relevant expressions. Lemma 3 allows us to say that this is the 
same as monopoly profits being significantly larger than duopoly profits. This condition is 
consistent with the environment in  modern network industries (Gottinger,2002) . Condition 
C5 simply collects conditions under which the “points” obtained by choosing either x or y are 
not too extreme to obscure the effects of the resource asymmetries. 
The restriction to monopoly functions of the type in Lemma 4 is more severe than 
necessary for the result. To see this consider the following. As a firm's stage resource 
endowment increases, it could use the additional resources to either choose more aggressive 
targets or to attempt to finish the stage quicker, or both. Proposition 4 seems to suggest that 
the rich firm will choose the more aggressive targets. Consider the case when a particular 
stage of the R&D process is directed toward cost reduction. In situations where demand is 
inelastic enough, there is less of an incentive for aggressive cost reduction, and we would 
expect firms to choose to finish the stages faster. In this regard, note that Lemma 4 holds for 
more general monopoly functions that satisfy 
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Now, s(B, h) falls as h rises (becomes less aggressive) and we can show that   
Ms(s(B,  h))  /  M(s(B, h)) has less effect as demand becomes more inelastic. Consequently, 
Lemma 4 will  hold for reduced form monopoly expressions as demand becomes more 
inelastic. In situations of sufficient demand elasticity, Lemma 4 (and, consequently, 
Proposition 4) may not hold. Then resource rich firms may not choose to direct their 
additional resources toward more aggressive targets. 
Empirical results show a weak correlation between aggressiveness and resource-richness 
(Gilbert, 1989). The theoretical discussion suggests two possible interpretations. (a) If, for 
example, the demand for personal  computers displays different elasticities in different local 
markets (US, Japan, Europe)
5, then we might expect there to be only imperfect correlation 
between aggressiveness and resource-richness when projects from the different markets are 
grouped together as here. (b) If demand for personal computers is not inelastic enough, then 
we would expect resource rich firms to aim for both higher speed in R&D and greater 
aggressiveness. This could once again cause imperfect correlation of the kind we observe. 
4. Multi-Stage Races 
In section 2, we saw that, under some conditions, identical firms behave differently 
depending on whether they are the first or the second firm to finish the first stage of a 
two-stage race. The underlying notion is that getting ahead and closer to the finish line results 
 
5   This could be due to differences in the availability of substitute computing resources eg distributed computer 
networks.  31 
in different choices (aggressive behaviour or quick behaviour) than falling behind. These 
results flowed from our introduction of system complexity and from our departure from the 
conventional patent-race framework which ignores the competition that occurs when two or 
more firms have access to a new technology. Then, in section 3, we demonstrated the 
relevance of this framework by showing how it casts some light on the data that we gathered 
from  our study of product development in the mainframe computer industry. Now, we 
investigate the implications of this framework for multistage races and suggest that some of 
the existing results in the literature hold only under very specific assumptions when we move 
away from the patent-race framework. 
All the existing literature on multi-stage races is in the patent race framework. Harris and 
Vickers (1987) show that the leader invests more than the follower in a multistage patent race 
scenario. Their result generalizes a similar result due to Grossman and Shapiro (1987) for 
two-stage games. In contrast, instead of analyzing aggregate resource allocation, we discuss 
how given resources are allocated. As in earlier parts of this paper, there is a tradeoff between 
being aggressive or being fast in each stage of a multi-stage race. Our focus will be on 
characterizing the differences in the expected payoff function of firms as they get ahead of 
their rivals (or fall behind) and closer to the finish line. We will speak of the monopoly 
(respectively, duopoly) term becoming more important in a payoff expression as the ratio of 
its coefficient to that of the duopoly (respectively, monopoly) term rises. In particular, we 
show the following. 
 
Proposition 5: The monopoly term in the expected payoff expression of the leading firm in a 
two-firm multi-stage race becomes progressively more important as it gets further ahead of 
its rival, providing the lead meets a minimum threshold. This threshold lead is smaller the 
closer is the lead firm to the finish fine. Conversely, the duopoly term in the expected payoff 
expression of the 1agging firm becomes more important as it falls further behind, subject to 
the same threshold lead considerations as the leading firm. 
 
Proof: 
The detailed analytics are in appendix 2. Here we sketch the method used. 
First, we derive an expression for the leading firm's payoff, when it bas finished all stages 
and is reaping monopoly profits, as a function of the lead it has over its rival. Let Wn-1 be the 
payoff of the lead firm when it has finished all n stages, and the rival is in stage 1. Let 
q1, … , qn. be the lagging firm's choices of hazard rates for the n stages. Then 
 W n-1= 
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We show that the coefficient on the monopoly term rises faster than that on the duopoly 
term as the lead increases. 
Then, using this property of the coefficients, we consider the expression for the leading 
firm's payoff, Vn,n-j  , as a function of its lead j, when it is in the last stage of the n stage race. 
 V n,n-j = 
j n n
j n n j n j n
q p r




+ ) 1 ( .  
Once again, we show that as long as the lead exceeds a threshold lead (which may be 0), 
the coefficient on the monopoly term rises faster than that on the duopoly term as the lead 
increases. This method of recursion, where the relationships on the coefficients when the lead 
firm is at stage S of the race is used to derive similar relationships when the lead firm is at 
stage S-1, yields our result. 
The procedure is similar far the lagging firm. First we derive an expression far its payoff, 
as a function of how much it lags the rival, when the rival has finished all stages and the 
lagging firm is at stage f. Denote this by Ln-f. Then 
  Ln-f =  D








So the payoff when the firm is j + 1 stages bebind the leading firm at stage n is given by 
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Then we show that the duopoly coefficients rise faster than the monopoly ones as the lead 
increases, subject to  the threshold lead considerations. The same is shown to be true 
recursively when the lead firm is at position n-1, n-2, etc. 
Hence the result. 
This characterization highlights two forces that influence a firm's choices in the various 
stages: proximity to the finish line and distance between the firms. The probability of reaping 
monopoly profits is higher the farther ahead a firm is of its rival, and even more so the closer 
the firm is to the finish line. If the lead firm is far from the finish line, even a sizeable lead 
may not translate into the dominance of the monopoly profit term, since there is plenty of time 
far the lead situation to be reversed and failure to finish first remains a probable outcome. In 
contrast, the probability that the lagging firm will get to be a monopolist becomes smaller as it 
falls behind the lead firm. This raises the following question. What kinds of actions cause a 
firm to get ahead? Intuitively, one would expect that a firm that is ahead of its rival at any 
time t, in the sense of having completed more stages by time t, is likely to bave chosen the 
faster, less aggressive strategy more often. We can construct numerical estimates of  the  33 
probability that a leading firm is more likely to have chosen less aggressively (faster) to verify 
this intuition
6. 
We have shown that the monopoly term is increasingly important to a firm as it gets ahead 
of its rival, and that the duopoly term is increasingly important to a firm that falls behind. 
Further simple calculations suggest that the firm that is ahead is likely to have made less 
aggressive choices than the firm that is behind in the race. 
One question of interest is whether chance leads result in greater likelihood of increasing 
lead, or in more catchup behavior. The existing literature (Grossman and Shapiro (1987), 
Harris and Vickers (1987)) has suggested that a firm that surges ahead of its rival increases its 
investment in R&D and speeds up while a lagging firm reduces its investment in R&D and 
slows down. Consequently these papers suggest that the lead continues to increase. However, 
when duopoly competition and system complexity are accounted for, the speeding up of a 
leading firm occurs only under special circumstances. We suggest that the computer industry 
is one in which monopoly profits do not change substantially with increased aggressiveness, 
but duopoly profits do not change substantially with increased aggressiveness(Shapiro,1989) 
Then a firm getting far enough ahead such that the monopoly term dominates its payoff 
expression will always choose the fast strategy, while a firm that gets far enough behind will 
always choose the slow and aggressive approach. Then the lead is likely to continue to 
increase. If, on the other hand, both monopoly and duopoly profits increase substantially with 
increased aggressiveness then even large leads can vanish with significant probability. 
 
 
6   Suppose that the lagging firm has completed m stages of the race at some time t. If we assume that each firm 
chooses either the more aggressive action in each stage or the less aggressive option at each stage, then the 
number of stages that have been completed by a given time can be treated as the number of arrivals generated 
by a random variable with a Poisson distribution. Without this assumption, the stage completion times are 
exponentially distributed with different parameters, and the sum of the m stage completion times does not 
follow a standard distribution.  
  Let E be the event that the leading fim chose less aggressively than the lagging firm in each of the first m 
stages, and let E- be the complement event that the leading firm chose more aggressively than the lagging 
firm in each of the first m stages. Let A be the event lbat the lagging fim is at stage m at time t. Then we want 
to calculate 
 Prob(E|A) = Pr ob (A| E) . Prob (E)/ [ Prob (A|E) . Prob (E) + Prob (A|E
c) . Prob (E
c) 
      In this expression, if x denotes the less aggressive strategy and y the more aggressive one, then P(A |E) can  
be shown to be given by  
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  This is so because P(A |E) is the probability that the leading firm's Poisson process has completed more than 
the m stages than the lagging firm's Poisson process at time t, given that the leading firm chose less 
aggressively. Think of an event being the completion of a stage by either firm i.e. an arrival by either of the 
Poisson process then the probability that an event is due to the leading firm's process is x/(x + y). Then  
P(A | E), the probability that the leading firm’s process completes m stages before the lagging firm’s process, 
is the probability that, of the first 2m-1 events, at last m events are due to the leading firm’s process.  34 
5. Conclusion 
The main contribution of this paper has been to formalize the implications of system 
complexity for firms' R&D strategies. Product development typically proceeds in a sequence 
of stages, each of which determines the degree to which some subset of product 
characteristics is developed. In contrast to the existing literature's focus on how firms choose 
their aggregate level of investment in R&D, we discuss how given R&D rcsources are utilized 
in the different stages of the R&D process. Our model makes explicit how scarce R&D 
resources result in a tradeoff between the aggressiveness of the targeted objectives at each 
tage and the speed with which that stage is completed. Ex-ante differences between firms 
influence the way in which firms exercise their discretion in each stage. 
Observations of R&D processes in the mainframe computer industry were used to motivate 
our framework. We found strong agreement between the theoretical prediction and the 
empirical results regarding the correlation between market incumbency and the 
aggressiveness of firms' targets. We showed that the fact that higher market share firms 
appear to choose more aggressive targets is an instance of the “replacement effect”
7. Further, 
we found a weak correlation between a firm's R&D resource endowment and its targeted level 
of aggressiveness. Theory allows us to suggest some reasons why this might be so. For 
example, theory suggests that we could expect a strong correlation if the degree of demand 
elasticity was determined by the availability of substitute computing resources.   
The second contribution of this paper was to make explicit the two forces that influence a 
firm's choices in the various stages of a multi-stage race: proximity to the finish line and 
distance between the firms. In doing so, we suggested two things. First, the existing literature, 
by focusing on the issue of aggregate resources devoted to R&D as the sequential game 
progresses, ignores the factors that influence the way in which these resources are utilized. 
Second, while conclusions in the existing literature continue to hold when we depart from the 
conventional patent-race framework, they do so only under special circumstances. 
 
 
7   The conventional “replacement effect” suggests that an incumbent monopolist will invest less in R&D than 
an entrant in order to delay cannibalization of the profit stream from its existing product.  35 
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Appendix 1 
 
Proof of Lemmas 
Define T(q) = q/(r + q - 1). 
 
Proof of Lemma 1 
The terms can be expressed as follows. 
  rW = M+ q(D-W) Þ W =  (M  + qD)/(r+q)   
where  
q = rival's D stage strategy 
M, D = monopoly, duopoly profits 
  rL -= p(D-L)  Þ L = pD/ (r+p) 
where p = own D stage strategy 
  M> W(i)   Û   M > qD(i) / (r + q - 1)     
There are two cases to consider. If r + q < 1, then lemma is true trivially. So consider 
r + q > 1. Since T'(q) < 0, so T(y) > T(x). Also M(x,x) is the lowest value that M(pr,pd) can 
assume. So if M(x, x) > T(y)D(i), then M > T(q)D(i) will hold for all realizations of q, pr, pd. 
Note finally that M(p,p.) > T(q)D(i) suffices to ensure that M > W(i) for all x, y combinations 
that map into i. Part (a) follows. For part (b), 
   W> L   Û   M > r(p - q) D / (r + p) 
Here p and q are the two firms' D stage strategies. If p < q, or p = q, then result follows 
immediately.If p = x, q = y so that p > q, then define  








Then    
   g >T(y) Þ  r > xy + y
2 /[xy - y
2 - (1-r)(x-y)] > 1 
So    
  g  < T(y). Then M(x,x)> T(z)D(i) Þ M(x,x) > gD(i)  38 
So part (b) holds. 
The fact that M/W and W/L are increasing functions of M/D can be seen by writing the 
following expressions 
       M/W = [1 + q/(M/D)]
-1  , W/L = [(r + p)/(r + q)] [1M/pD + q/p] 
Hence the result. 
 
Proof of Lemma 3 
We want to show that the following conditions are consistent. 
As in the proof of lemma 1, M larger than W, L follows if M is larger than D. 
As in lemma 2, the condition 
       xD(i) < yD(i + 1) Þ xL(i) <  yL(i + 1) 
   The only thing that remains to be checked is that it is possible to have xM(.,x)>yM(.,y) 
and xW(i) < yW(i + 1) together. To see this, note that 
         xW(i) <  yW(I + 1)  Þ q(yD(I + 1) - xD(i))  >  (xM(., x) -  yM(., y) - c(x - y) 
Rewrite this as 
















Let q = x (since we just want to show possibility) and let 
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This is satisfied for any realization of the RHS if k is small enough. 
So, if x and y are sufficiently close, x > y, x,y in (0, 1), then the conditions stated in the 
lemma can hold concurrently. 
Hence the result.  39 
Proof of Lemma 4 
Let M, denote the derivative of M with respect to s(B,h). Then Ms= Kqs
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where the inequality follows from the SCA. Rearranging, we have 
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Hence the result.  40 
Appendix 2 
 
Proof of Proposition 5 
We will speak of the monopoly (respectively, duopoly) term becoming more important in a 
payoff expression as the ratio of its coefficient to that of the duopoly (respectively, monopoly) 
term rises. We show that the monopoly term in the payoff expression of a leading firm 
becomes progressively more important than the duopoly term as it gets further ahead of its 
rival in a multi stage race (as long as the lead is great enough), while the duopoly term 
assumes greater significance for the lagging firm as it gets further behind. 
Let p1,....,pn indicate the choices of hazard rate by the leading firm in each of the n stages, 
and let q1,....,qn, indicate the analogous choices by the lagging firm. For convenience, we will 
denote a firm's flow monopoly profits, which are a function of the its hazard rates, by M and 
flow duopoly profits, which are a function of the "points" system introduced in the paper, by 
D. 
First consider the leading firm. We will derive an expression for its payoff when it has 
finished all stagges while its rival has not and will show that the coefficient of M rises faster 
than the coefficient of D as the rival gets further behind, as long as the rival is far enough 
bebind. We will then show that this property of the coefficients holds whatever the position of 
the leading firm (i.e. it need not already have finished all the stages of the race). 
Let Wn-1 be the expected payoff of the leading firm when it has finished all stages, and its 
rival is still engaged in stage 1. Then 
 rWn-1 = M+ql(Wn-(l+1) – Wn-1) 
where M = M(pl,...pn) = leaders monopoly profits 
 q 1 = laggard’s stage l strategy 
 So  Wn-1=  2
1
1




























By repeated substitution as above, and by using the fact that 
 W o = 
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So Wo is the expected payoff of the leading firm when it has finished all stages and the 
laggard is in the last stage. 
Using the following notation 
  hj = Wn(n-j)’s M term coefficient 
  gj = Wn(n-j)’s D term coefficient 
the following recurrence relations hold 






























It follows that, when the leading firm has finished all n stages, as the lead widens, the 
coefficient of M rises relative to that of D since 
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Now consider the situation when the lead firm is in the final stage n. If Vn,n-j, is its payoff 
when it is in stage n and the laggard is j stages behind, then 
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If the rival's actions are the same (i.e. qn-j, is the same for all j)
8, then we can write this as 
  C BV AW V j n n j j n n - + = - - - ) 1 ( , ,  
where A,B,C are constants. 
Using the following notation 
 
8   It is not necessary to use this. The critical fact used in the recursive relations below is that both A and B, 
defined below, are always less than 1, regardless of the rival’s strategic choice.  42 
  mj = Vn,nj’s  M term coefficient 
  lj = Vn,nj’s  D term coefficient 
the following recurrence relations hold 
  mj+1 = Ahj+1’s + Bmj    (i) 
  lj+1 = Agj+1 + Blj 
where hj,gj are as before 
Then 
  mj = Ahj + Bmj-1=  Ahj+B(Ahj-1+Bmj-2) =A(hj+Bhj-1) +B
2mj-1 
Repeating this recursion gives us 




where m0 = Vn,n’s M term coefficient 
Similarly, 




where l0 = Vn,n’s D term coefficient 






















             
The inequality on the right hand side can be expanded to read as 
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Now, recall from the analysis of the coefficients when the leading firm had finished all the 
stages that  
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Inequality (ii) will be satisfied for j large enough regardless of the relative magnitude of mo, 
and lo (since B < 1). It follows that the coefficients of the monopoly term rise faster than 
those of the duopoly term once the lead (j) gets large enough and the leader is in the final 
stage. 
Thus far we have used our knowledge of the fact that the monopoly coefficients rise faster 
than the duopoly ones when the lead firm has finished all stages to derive a similar result for 
the corresponding coefficients when the lead firm is in the final stage and the lead is large 
enough. A similar recursive analysis (i.e. using the pattern of coefficients when the leader is at 
stage n-m to derive the pattern of coefficients when the leader is at stage n-m-l) establishes 
that the monopoly coefficients will rise faster than the duopoly ones regardless of the lead 
firm's position as long as the lead is large enough. 
Further, it is possible to show that the further the lead firm gets from the finishing line, the 
greater is the lead needed before the property about this monopoly and duopoly coefficients 
holds. This can be seen if we reinterpret the notation from above as follows. Let the h and g 
terms refer to the monopoly and duopoly coefficients when the leader is at stage n-m, and let 
g and X refer to the coefficients when the leader is at n-m-1
9. Let j refer to the lead as before. 
Call the following inequalities condition (iii) 
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    Similarly for j = 3,4...... 
For any m, the condition (iii) inequality for a particular lead j must hold true for the 
monopoly coefficient to rise faster than the duopoly coefficient when the leader is at stage 
n-m-1. 
Now consider the conditions (iii) when m = S. If mo is larger than lo, this is more likely to 
cause a problem for the conditions for low j than for higher j. Suppose the conditions above 
 
9   Then m varies from -1 to n, and m = -1 is the situation when the lead firm has finished the race. Then the 
above deduction of the properties of the coefficients when the lead firm is at stage n from the properties when 
the lead firm has finished all n stages corresponds to m = -1.  44 
do not hold for j = 0 and j = 1, but do hold for j > 1 (in stage m = S). Then, in the next 
recursion when m = S + 1, we have 




























Then we see that in conditions (iii) for m = S + 1, it is even more likely that the low j 
inequalities will not hold, and we will need j to be higher than for the m = S situation for the 
inequalities to hold. Thus the higher is m, i.e. the greater is the distance of the lead firm from 
the end of the race, the greater has to be the lead before the monopoly coefficient starts rising 
faster than the duopoly coefficient. 
Now we turn our attention to the lagging firm. The analysis procceds in a manner similar 
to that for the leading firm. Let L, denote the lagging firm's payoff when the leader has 
finished all n stages. Let p1..,pn denote the choices of hazard rate for each of the n stages by 
the lagging firm. Then 
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As above, we are interested in understanding how the coefficients of the M and D terms 
behave. Consider the lagging firm's payoff when il is at stage n-(j + 1) and the leading firm is 
at stage n. Then 
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Adopting notation similar to that used above, we have 
  gj = Ln-j’s D term coefficient 
  mj = Vn-jn’s M term coefficient 
  lj = Vn-jj’s D term coefficient 
Then 
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i.e. duopoly term coefficients rise faster than the monopoly term coefficients as the lagging 
firm gets further behind the leading firm when the latter is at stage n. 
Then we carry out the recursion. So when the leader is at stage n-1, and the laggard is j + 1 
stages behind, the latter's payoff is  45 
 V n-1(j+1)n-1= 
1 2
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Then we let hj and  gj  be the M and D term coefficients when the leader is at stage n, and 
mj, and lj be those when the leader is at stage n-1, and we derive recurrence relations for the m 
and l coefficients in much the same way as the analysis for the leading firm. The conclusions 
are similar. The coefficients of the duopoly term in the lagging firm's payoff expression rise 
faster than those of the monopoly term when the lead is large enough. 